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TRADEMARKS-THIRD CIRCUIT STRENGTHENS TRADEMARK
PROTECTION UNDER THE TRADEMARK AND COUNTERFEITING
ACT OF 1984
Vuitton v. White (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vuitton v. White,' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rein-
forced a trademark owner's right to protect its interest in a trademark
from counterfeiters who seek to free-ride on the reputation for quality
and value associated with the trademark. The court supported a trade-
mark owner's right to obtain an ex parte seizure order when denial of
such an order would cause the plaintiff irreparable harm.2
In addition, in considering a matter of first impression for all cir-
cuits, the Vuitton court held that the denial of an ex parte seizure request
is subject to immediate appeal. 3 This procedure allows plaintiffs to pro-
cess an appeal before defendant counterfeiters have the opportunity to
destroy evidence of the counterfeiting or pick up shop and relocate. Ad-
ditionally, the court held that a district court denying a request for a
seizure order must explain how an alternative remedy would equally
protect the trademark owner's interest.4
II. BACKGROUND
Trademark law represents judicial and legislative recognition of the
need to protect a merchant's use of a symbol to identify its product from
unpermitted use by others. 5 Federal trademark legislation consists of
The Trademark Act of 1946, known as the Lanham Act, The Trademark
1. 945 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the facts of Vuitton, see
infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the analysis by the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 32-92 and accompanying text.
2. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 576.
3. Id. at 574.
4. Id. at 575. Before a district court can issue a seizure order, it must make
several prerequisite factual findings. For a discussion of the necessary findings,
see infra note 35 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit's requirement that
the court explain the adequacy of an alternative remedy has as a necessary pre-
condition that the plaintiff establish the other elements necessary for the issu-
ance of a seizure order.
5. See SEIGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 8, 11
(2d ed. 1991). Recognition and protection of trademarks serves three purposes:
(1) identifying the origin of a product; (2) assuring consistent quality; and
(3) preserving product and company goodwill. Id. at 8-10. In this context,
goodwill refers to the value of name and symbol recognition that accrues to a
producer as a result of use, advertising and sales. Id. at 10. These purposes
have been advanced by the common law and by statutory enactment at both the
state and federal level. For an example of the early federal common law, see
(1196)
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and Counterfeiting Act of 1984, and The Trademark Revision Act of
1988.6 The Lanham Act protects a trademark owner's rights by provid-
ing that one who "use[s] in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit...
or colorable imitation" of a trademark is "liable in a civil action"
brought by the trademark owner. 7
The most common form of relief granted under the Lanham Act is
an injunction.8 Additionally, a court will often issue a temporary re-
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916). Recognizing the
existence of such common law protection, the Hanover Star Court stated:
[N]one of the parties here concerned has registered the [disputed]
trade-mark under any act of Congress or under the law of any State.
Nor does it appear that in any of the States in question there exists any
peculiar local rule, arising from statute or decision. Hence, the cases
must be decided according to common-law principles of general
application.
Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 410-11.
Today federal regulation of trademarks is governed by statute and is limited
to trademarks used in interstate commerce. See United States v. Steffens, 100
U.S. 82 (1879) (holding Trademark Act of 1870 unconstitutional because it went
beyond regulating trademarks used in interstate commerce); see also ARTHUR H.
SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADEMARK
AND COPYRIGHT 2, 13-16 (5th ed. 1986) (discussing role of state and federal
trademark statutes and their relationship to common law protection). Modern
state statutes deal primarily with procedures afforded to enforce the right to
exclusive use and remedial provisions if an infringement of exclusivity is found.
See RICHARD F. DOLE, JR., TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST
LAws 31 (1985).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988). This legisla-
tion is intended to "secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing prod-
ucts." KANE, supra note 5, at 11 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Park N' Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). This section governs lawsuits for the infringement
of federally registered trademarks. Id. Federal registration is not mandatory but
does provide the owner with several benefits, including prima facie evidence of
the. registrant's ownership and exclusive right to the trademark. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1057(b). For a complete discussion of the additional benefits of registration
and the procedure to follow to obtain registration, see KANE, supra note 5, at 79-
104.
In order to invoke the protection of the Act, however; the trademark owner
must demonstrate that the use of the disputed mark by another, without permis-
sion, is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a).
8. KANE, supra note 5, at 265. Injunctive relief may force the infringing
party to discontinue use of the trademark and recall infringing items. Id. In-
junctive relief may be in the form of a preliminary or permanent injunction and,
under certain circumstances, a temporary restraining order may be issued. The
Lanham Act provides that the courts "shall have power to grant injunctions,
according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable." 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). In federal courts, the procedure the courts
must follow in considering motions for permanent and preliminary injunctions
and temporary restraining orders is controlled by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
Temporary restraining orders are issued as an interim measure prior to the
court's consideration of the request for a preliminary injunction. See CHARLES A.
2
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straining order when the plaintiff alleges counterfeit use of its mark.9
Because of the nature of the counterfeiter's operation, however, tradi-
tional injunctive relief, including temporary restraining orders, has not
proven to be a strong deterrent to the rise of counterfeiting activities.10
Some federal courts responded to the failure of traditional relief by
issuing seizure orders "providing for the seizure of the counterfeit mer-
chandise and related business records by the U.S. marshals or plaintiff's
agent."" Not all courts, however, were persuaded that they had the
authority to enter ex parte seizure orders. 12
As a result of the courts' hesitancy, and in response to growing
abuse of trademarks, Congress enacted The Trademark and Counter-
feiting Act of 1984 (Counterfeiting Act).' 3 This legislation explicitly
grants the district courts authority to issue ex parte seizure orders pro-
viding for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks used in connection
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2951, at 498
(1973). Temporary restraining orders are "designed to preserve the status quo
until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a prelimi-
nary injunction." Id. The purpose of preserving the status quo is to prevent the
plaintiff from suffering irreparable harm prior to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Id.
9. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs when a court
may issue a temporary restraining order. Pursuant to Rule 65, a temporary re-
straining order may be issued "without written or oral notice to the adverse
party ... if (1) it clearly appears ... that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party ... can be heard
in opposition." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
Temporary restraining orders may be granted with or without notice to the
adverse party. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2951, at 498; see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 65(b) (application of rule limited to ex parte without-notice grant of tem-
porary restraining order). In counterfeit cases, the plaintiffs generally seek, and
the courts routinely grant, ex parte orders. Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 571-
72 (3d Cir. 1991) (court does not raise issue of appropriateness of ex parte
relief).
Counterfeit use is the use of "a spurious mark which is identical with, or
substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Such counterfeit use is always a trademark infringement. KANE, supra note 5, at
140 ("All counterfeits are infringements .... A counterfeit mark is identical to
or substantially indistinguishable from plaintiff's mark.").
10. See KANE, supra note 5, at 141. Counterfeiters often were able to pick up
shop and conceal or destroy infringing merchandise, thereby avoiding both in-
junctions and damage awards. See Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 571 (citingJ.Joseph Bain-
ton, Seizure Orders: An Innovative Judicial Response to the Realities of Trademark
Counterfeiting, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 459, 464 (1983)). The failure of traditional
injunctive relief contradicts the very purpose of such relief. See WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 8, § 2947, at 423-24 ("[T]he most compelling reason in favor
of . . . [granting a preliminary injunction] is the need to prevent the judicial
process from being rendered futile by defendant's action or refusal to act.").
11. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 572 (citing Fimab-Finanziaria Maglificio Biellese
Fratelli Fila S.P.A. v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Fla. 1982)).
12. Id.
13. The provisions of the Counterfeiting Act are codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1116(d), 1117(b) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1988).
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with the sale or distribution of goods. 14 The Counterfeiting Act also
sets out certain requirements that must be satisfied before a court can
issue an ex parte seizure order. Importantly, a court must make certain
factual findings before it can issue such an order. 15
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts & Procedural History
Vuitton is a seller of high quality luggage and related items and
holds trademarks in its name and in the distinctive arrangement of its
initials. 16 Vuitton claimed to have begun over a thousand cases based
upon allegations of counterfeiting and related frauds in the last fifteen
years.1 7 After observing vending activity on the streets of Philadelphia,
Vuitton alleged that both curbside vendors and independent wholesal-
ers were selling counterfeit leather goods bearing Vuitton's distinctive
trademark. ' 8
In October 1989, Vuitton filed a counterfeiting action in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania against several street vendors, 19 seeking
both temporary restraining and ex parte seizure orders.2 0 The district
court granted the temporary restraining order, but denied the requested
seizure orders. 2 1 On February 20, 1990, the district court granted per-
manent injunctive relief.22
14. Specifically, the Counterfeiting Act provides in part that "upon ex parte
application . . . [the district court may] grant an order . . . providing for the
seizure of goods and counterfeit marks." 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(I)(A).
The Counterfeiting Act defines counterfeit marks as:
(i) a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or serv-
ices sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use, whether or
not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark was so
registered; or
(ii) a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indis-
tinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies of this chap-
ter are made available by reason of section 380 of Title 36.
Id. § 1116(d)(l)(B).
15. See id. § 11 16(d)(4)(B). For a discussion of the necessary factual find-
ings which a district court must make prior to issuing an ex parte seizure order,
see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
16. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 570. Vuitton has been selling its merchandise
throughout the United States for over fifty years. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Vuitton alleged that it has "had a problem with counterfeiting in
Philadelphia since at least 1983." Id. As noted by the court, many of the ven-
dors "openly admitted that their merchandise was not authentic." Id.
20. Id. Vuitton called upon the power of the district court to grant seizure
orders pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(l)(A) (1988). Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The injunctive relief was entered by default when the defendants
failed to respond to the notice of hearing. Id.
1992] 1199
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 27
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/27
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1196
In spite of the initial remedies, Vuitton continued to observe coun-
terfeiting activity by street vendors who defied the injunction.23 Conse-
quently, on November 13, 1990, Vuitton brought two actions in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 24 One action, Vuitton v. Lee,2 5 was
brought against street vendors, while a second action, Vuitton v. White,2 6
was brought against a wholesaler. In each case, Vuitton moved ex parte
for a temporary restraining order and a seizure order. 2 7 As in Vuitton's
initial action, the district court granted temporary restraining orders but
denied the requested seizure orders. 28
Vuitton appealed the denial of the requested seizure orders to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 29 On appeal, the issue presented to the
Third Circuit was whether the district court had abused its discretion
when it denied Vuitton's request for an ex parte seizure order. 30 Before
reaching this issue, however, the Third Circuit had to address an initial
issue which had not been previously addressed by any of the circuits:
whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial
of a seizure order request.3 '
B. Analysis of the Third Circuit
1. Overview
In Vuitton, the Third Circuit considered whether, in an action for
relief under the Counterfeiting Act, a district court's denial of a request
for a seizure order is immediately appealable.3 2 The Third Circuit held
that under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the statute controlling appellate re-
view of interlocutory decisions, it had jurisdiction to hear an immediate
appeal from a denial of an ex parte seizure order. 33
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. No. 90-1956 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
26. No. 90-1957 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
27. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 570.
28. Id. The district court gave the following explanation for its denial of
the seizure order:
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate at the conference with the court on -No-
vember 13th, 1990 that an order other than an ex parte seizure order is
not adequate to achieve the purposes of section 32 of the Lanham Act.
Nor did plaintiff demonstrate an immediate and irreparable injury will
occur if such seizure is not ordered.
Id. at 571-72 (quoting district court's order cancelling hearing on request for
preliminary injunction).
29. Vuitton filed timely notices of appeal, and a motion to consolidate the
two cases was granted. Id. at 571.
30. Id. at 574.
31. Id. at 570.
32. Id. at 569-71.
33. Id. at 574. Title 28 of the United States Code § 1292 confers jurisdic-
tion upon the several courts of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ..
1200
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After answering the jurisdictional question in the affirmative, the
court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the
requested seizure order without explaining how an alternative remedy
would be sufficient. 34 When considering Vuitton's ex parte seizure re-
quest, the district court in Vuitton originally made six of the seven re-
quired findings, failing to find that an order other than an ex parte
seizure order was not adequate. 5 The Third Circuit in Vuitton imposed
an obligation on the lower court to explain how, having found the other
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1988).
The court stated in dictum, however, that it would be without jurisdiction to
hear an interlocutory appeal challenging the granting of such a seizure order.
Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573. This paralleled the result reached on different grounds
by the Second Circuit in General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chemical & Oil, 768
F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit did not reach the matter of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because it concluded that the order
granting the seizure request failed the test established by the Supreme Court in
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981). Gibson, 786 F.2d at 108..
For a discussion of the test set forth in Carson, see infra note 70 and accompany-
ing text.
34. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 575.
35. Id. at 570. This factor is one of the seven prerequisite factual findings
required by the Counterfeiting Act. 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(i) (1988). Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, before a district court can grant an ex parte seizure
order under the terms of the Counterfeiting Act, it must make seven factual
findings. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 574 n.5. The statutory factors the court relied
upon are found in 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B), which provides that a court shall
not grant a seizure order unless:
the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts that-
(i) an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not adequate to
achieve the purposes of section 1114 of this title;
(ii) the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure;
(iii) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the person
against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark in con-
nection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or
services;
(iv) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is
not ordered;
(v) the matter to be seized will be located at the place identified in the
application;
(vi) the harm to the applicant of denying the application outweighs
the harm to the legitimate interests of the person against whom the
seizure would be ordered of granting the application; and
(vii) the person against whom the seizure would be ordered, or per-
sons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or
otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if the applicant
were to proceed on notice to such person.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(d)(4)(B).
At a later hearing, where Vuitton asked the district court to cancel the pre-
liminary injunction hearing, the district court explicitly stated that Vuitton had
failed to demonstrate that an order other than an ex parte seizure order would
be adequate. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 571.
6
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factors to be satisfied, an alternative remedy would be adequate. 36
In addition to imposing this obligation, the Third Circuit further
narrowed district court discretion in the area of the prerequisite factual
inquiry. When Vuitton sought to cancel the preliminary injunction hear-
ing so as to proceed with an appeal of the denial of the seizure order,
the district court restated its reasons for denying the seizure order re-
quest. The court stated that Vuitton was not threatened by an immedi-
ate and irreparable injury in the absence of a seizure order. 3 7 The Third
Circuit strengthened trademark protection by holding, as a matter of
law, that if an applicant for a seizure order demonstrates that the de-
fendant is likely to flaunt a preliminary injunction by continuing to sell
counterfeit merchandise and/or by destroying evidence, then the appli-
cant has shown a threat of immediate and irreparable harm.38
2. Jurisdictional Inquiry
The court's inquiry concerning the appealability of the denial of an
ex parte seizure order consisted of three components. First, the court
considered whether seizure orders are properly classified as injunctions
rather than as attachments or other forms of provisional remedy. 39 Sec-
ond, the court qualified its analysis by distinguishing between a denial
and a grant of a seizure order and by comparing and contrasting each
with a denial and grant of a temporary restraining order.40 Third, hav-
ing concluded that the denial of an application for a seizure order is
immediately appealable under a literal reading of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1), the court concluded its jurisdictional inquiry by subjecting
this denial to the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Carson v. Ameri-
36. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 575.
37. Id. The lower court made initial findings upon Vuitton's request for a
seizure order. Id. at 570. When Vuitton learned of the denial of its request and
sought to cancel the preliminary injunction hearing, the lower court reversed its
earlier finding of a threatened irreparable harm. Id. at 571. Such a finding is a
necessary statutory prerequisite to a seizure order. 15 U.S.C.A. § 11 16(d)(4)(B).
38. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 576. A temporary restraining order is the tradi-
tional alternative remedy granted by the courts. See In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606
F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979) (court of appeals granted Vuitton's application for writ of
mandamus directing lower court to issue ex parte temporary restraining order).
39. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 572. For a complete discussion of the court's rea-
soning concerning the classification of seizures as injunctions, see infra notes 42-
49 and accompanying text.
40. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573-74. This analysis was necessary because tempo-
rary restraining orders are also considered a form of injunction but have been
found to be unappealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Id. at 573. The court's
analysis at this point consisted of an effort to determine "whether orders grant-
ing or denying § 1116(d) seizure orders are more like orders resolving applica-
tions for temporary restraining orders or orders resolving applications for
preliminary injunctions." Id. For a discussion of why the grant or denial of a
temporary restraining order is not appealable, see infra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
1202 [Vol. 37: p. 1196
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can Brands, Inc. .
4
1
a. Seizure Orders Are Properly Classified as Injunctions
The Third Circuit began its jurisdictional inquiry by recognizing
that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides appellate jurisdiction over orders
granting or denying injunctions. 42 The court focused upon the text of
the Counterfeiting Act as evidence of Congressional intent to classify
seizure orders as injunctions. 4 3 The court first pointed to the fact that
the section of the Counterfeiting Act authorizing the district courts to
grant seizure orders is entitled "Injunctive Relief."4 4 Second, the court
took note of Congress' use of the term "injunction" to describe the
available remedy.4 5
In addition to the text of the Counterfeiting Act, the court looked to
the legislative history of the Act to support its conclusion that Congress
intended seizure orders to be classified as injunctions. 46 The legislative
history indicates that Congress derived the procedures for ex parte
seizure orders from Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders and prelimi-
nary injunctions. 4 7 The court also pointed to statements in the legisla-
tive history that "traditional principles of equity" shall still apply to
41. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 574 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U.S. 79 (1981)).
42. Id. at 571. The Vuitton court properly looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1988), which provides in part that "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1988).
43. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 572. The court found that the important inquiry
consisted of "[c]onstruing § 1116(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) together." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. "The words chosen indicate to us that Congress viewed § 1116(d)
seizure orders as a form of injunctive relief." Id.
46. Id. at 572-73.
47. The court quoted from the legislative history:
The procedures detailed in this section are largely derived from the
existing requirements of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Those requirements have been modified in certain respects to
conform them to the circumstances peculiar to seizures on an ex parte
basis. Except where the provisions of Rule 65 are inconsistent with the
requirements of this act, however, they will continue to apply, as will
traditional principles of equity.
Id. at 572-73 (quoting Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legisla-
tion, 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12080 (1984)).
"A temporary restraining order may be granted ... if ... immediate and
irreparable injury" will result from the absence of the order. FED. R. Civ. P.
65(b). Such an order "shall expire by its terms within... 10 days... unless...
extended for a like period" for good cause. Id. If a temporary restraining order
is granted ex parte, then a "motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set
down for hearing at the earliest possible time." Id.
8
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seizure orders. 4 8 The court concluded that such references to Rule 65
and to equity would be "inappropriate if Congress believed it was creat-
ing a form of legal remedy, such as an attachment." '4 9
b. The Denial of a Seizure Order Is Equivalent to a Denial of a
Preliminary Injunction
After the court concluded that seizure orders are properly classified
as injunctions, it next addressed the fact that temporary restraining or-
ders, also classified as injunctions, have been found unappealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1). 50 The court held that a denial of a seizure order
request is in effect more closely analogous to a denial of a preliminary
injunction and is therefore immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291(a)(1). 5 1 The court noted that "whether an application for a tem-
porary restraining order is granted or denied, the effect of the order is
extremely short lived and prompt appellate review is available."'5 2 The
grant of a temporary restraining order expires within ten days and, if
maintained, becomes a de facto grant of a preliminary injunction.5 3
When the order becomes a preliminary injunction, it is subject to imme-
diate appeal. 54 Similarly, upon a denial of a temporary restraining or-
der, the plaintiff may apply for a preliminary injunction and, if
unsuccessful, seek an immediate appeal. 5 5 Therefore, whether a tempo-
rary restraining order is granted or denied, the losing party can obtain
48. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 572-73 (quoting from Joint Statement on Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12080 (1984))'.
49. Id. at 573.
50. Id. The court noted that temporary restraining orders are also gov-
erned by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. This fact weak-
ened the court's reliance on Congress' stated intent to fashion the 15 U.S.C.
§ 1116(d) (1988) procedures after Rule 65. See id. The court therefore looked
past Congress' references to Rule 65 and- focused on the rights and remedies
that flow from the grant and denial of an application of a seizure order. Id.
The court cited Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947), for the prem-
ise that a restraining order continued after a ten day limit becomes a preliminary
injunction. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573.
51. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573-74.
52. Id. at 573. The court pointed out that when a court issues a temporary
restraining order, that order expires within ten days. Id. The court also noted
that, whether the temporary restraining order is granted or denied, the plaintiff
can always apply for a preliminary injunction. The losing party has a right to an
immediate appeal from the outcome of the preliminary injunction hearing. Id.
"[Olne of the primary factors that differentiates a ... [temporary re-
straining] order from a preliminary injunction" is "[tihe sharply limited duration
of a temporary restraining order." WRIGHT & MILLER, upra note 8, § 2953, at
517.
53. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573. This rule is contained in Rule 65 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. k. Civ. P. 65.
54. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573. "When the application for a preliminary in-
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immediate appellate review. 56 The court reasoned that the availability
of immediate judicial review explained why orders granting or denying
temporary restraining orders have been found to be unappealable. 5 7
The court then distinguished between grants of seizure orders and
denials of seizure orders. 58 The court found that the grant of a seizure
order is more closely analogous to a temporary restraining order and, as
a result, is not immediately appealable. 5 9 In this two step analysis, the
court looked closely at the procedural requirements of three different
forms of injunctive relief: temporary restraining orders, seizure orders
and preliminary injunctions.60 The court compared granting a seizure
order to granting or denying a temporary restraining order.6 1 In con-
trast, the court compared orders denying seizure requests to orders
granting or denying preliminary injunctions. 6 2
The Counterfeiting Act requires a district court that grants a seizure
order to schedule a hearing no later than fifteen days after the seizure
order is issued. 63 The court compared this prompt review with the fact
that a temporary restraining order expires within ten days.6 4 The court
reasoned that like the result of the review of a temporary restraining
order (either the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction), the result
of the review of the grant of a seizure order (either the dissolution or
modification of the order) was immediately appealable. 65 The court
concluded that because the "grant of an ex parte seizure order-like a
temporary restraining order-is short lived, [and] subject to prompt re-
consideration by the district court ... [at the end of the fifteen day pe-
riod, the grant itself was] not immediately appealable."16 6
As to denials of seizure orders, the court contrasted such denials
with temporary restraining orders and compared them to preliminary
injunctions. 67 The Counterfeiting Act does not provide a procedure for
prompt district court review of a denial of an application for a seizure
56. Id.
57. Id. The court quoted WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2962, at 618:
"The rationale for concluding that temporary restraining orders do not fall
within the interlocutory appeals statute is that they are of short duration and
terminate with the ruling on the preliminary injunction so that an immediate
appeal is not necessary to protect the rights of the parties." Vuitton, 945 F.2d at
573 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2962, at 618).
58. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573-74.
59. Id. at 573.
60. Id. at 573-74.
61. Id. at 573.
62. Id. at 572-73.
63. Id. at 573.
64. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (temporary restraining order expires
within ten days unless good cause is shown for extension).
65. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 573.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 573-74.
1992] 1205
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order.68 Absent appellate court review, a plaintiff would be forced to
await a final judgment before obtaining a review of the denial of its
seizure order request. The court held that Congress did not intend such
a result and that the denial of a "[section] 1116(d) application [is] the
equivalent of an order denying an application for a preliminary injunc-
tion" 69 and is therefore reviewable.
c. A Denial of a Seizure Order Satisfies the Carson Test
The third component of the court's jurisdictional inquiry was an ap-
plication of the two prong test established by the Supreme Court in Car-
son v. American Brands, Inc..7o The Third Circuit held that "any denial" of
68. Id. The court pointed out that there was no "§ 1116(d) equivalent of
[the FED. R. Civ. P. 65] ... application for a preliminary injunction." Id. at 574.
69. Id.
70. Id. In Carson, the petitioners had originally brought suit seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief and damages in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U.S. 79, 80-81 (1981). The petitioners represented a class of black employees of
the respondent. Id. The basis of the petitioner's original complaint was that the
employer and unions had engaged in racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices. Id. at 81.
Prior to trial, the parties negotiated a settlement consisting in part of pro-
spective relief. Id. The district court refused to enter the consent decree con-
cluding that the decree "illegally granted racial preferences to the petitioner
class." Id. at 82. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
dismissed the petitioner's appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id. (citing Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Fourth Circuit held
that the refusal to enter a consent decree was neither a collateral order under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 nor an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Carson,
450 U.S. at 82.
The Supreme Court then held that "[u]nless a litigant can show that an
interlocutory order of the district court might have a 'serious, perhaps irrepara-
ble, consequence,' and that the order can be 'effectually challenged' only by im-
mediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will
preclude interlocutory appeal." Carson, 450 U.S. at 84 (quoting Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)).
The Third Circuit in Vuitton held that, based upon its recent decision in
Ross v. Zavarella, 916 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1990), the Carson test was applicable to
"orders concerning injunctions, that are clearly covered by § 1292(a)(1)." Vuit-
ton, 945 F.2d at 574. In Ross, the petitioner was a judge with the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Ross, 916 F.2d at 899. Plaintiff
brought suit in federal district court against the defendants,Justices of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, seeking an injunction to prevent them from reassigning
petitioner from the Orphans' Court Division to the Civil Division. Id.
The district court dismissed the suit against the Justices, and the plaintiff
sought review with the Third Circuit. Id. Upon appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the dismissal of the suit was the equivalent of the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion and therefore immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1)
(1988). Ross, 916 F.2d at 899. The Third Circuit agreed that the district court's
dismissal of the suit was in fact a denial of a preliminary injunction but neverthe-
less dismissed the appeal for want of an appealable order. Id. at 899-900.
The relevant issue in Ross was whether the indirect denial of plaintiff's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction was immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). Ross, 916 F.2d at 901 (indirect nature of action resulted from fact
11
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a seizure order satisfies both prongs of the Carson test because such a
denial might have a serious and irreparable consequence and because an
applicant has no means other than an immediate direct appeal to effec-
tively challenge the denial. 7 1
In Carson, the Court held that the district court's order had the prac-
tical effect of denying an injunction. 72 The Court asserted that in order
to be immediately appealable, even if the action was within the literal
reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the litigant must show both a "seri-
ous, perhaps irreparable consequence" and that the order can only be
"effectually challenged" by immediate appeal. 73
Looking to Carson, the Third Circuit in Vuitton concluded that the
denial of an application for a seizure order satisfied both prongs of the
Carson test.7 4 The court found a "serious, perhaps irreparable, conse-
quence" in the fact that alleged counterfeiters will disappear and evade
legal process. 75 The court concluded that an immediate appeal was the
only way to "effectively challenge" the denial, because waiting for a final
judgment would result in the destruction of the evidence sought to be
seized. 7 6
3. Duty to Explain Adequacy of Alternative Remedy
Having established its jurisdiction, the court next considered
whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the
that district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss rendering plaintiff's
request for injunction moot). The court stated that the plaintiff must "show
more than that the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction." Id.
(quoting Carson, 450 U.S. at 84). The court in Ross reasoned that the Carson
requirements reflected the Supreme Court's concern about "adopting a stan-
dard of appealability under section 1292(a)(1) that would undermine the con-
gressional policy against piecemeal appeals." Id. (citing Carson, 450 U.S. at 79).
71. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 574.
72. Carson, 450 U.S. at 83. "This is because the proposed decree would
have permanently enjoined respondents from discriminating against black em-
ployees . . . and would have directed changes in seniority and benefit systems,
established hiring goals . . . and granted job-bidding preferences for seasonal
employees. Indeed, prospective relief was at the very core of the disapproved
settlement." Id. at 83-84.
73. Id. at 84. The Court noted that if the challenged action failed this test
then the "general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude
interlocutory appeal." Id. The Court further held that the loss of the opportu-
nity to settle a case on negotiated terms would constitute a "serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence." Id. at 88. The serious and irreparable consequence
identified was the denial of the parties' right to compromise their dispute on
mutually agreeable terms. Id. Additionally, the Court found that in the absence
of a settlement, continued discrimination by the respondent would also consti-
tute a "serious, perhaps irreparable" consequence. Id. at 89-90.
74. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 574.
75. Id. This concern is consistent with the purpose of the Counterfeiting
Act as it is described by the court. Id. at 572.
76. Id. at 574.
1992] 1207
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seizure application. 77 Before a district court can issue a seizure order
under the Counterfeiting Act, it must make seven factual findings. 78 In
Vuitton, the district court made six of the seven required findings and
issued an ex parte temporary restraining order. 79 The Third Circuit
concluded that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
explain how such an ex parte temporary restraining order would be ade-
quate.8 0 By imposing this affirmative duty upon a district court to ex-
plain how an alternative remedy would be adequate, the court effectively
shifted the burden of demonstrating adequacy of the remedy from the
plaintiff to the court.8 '
Although the district court originally found the existence of six of
the necessary factual predicates to the grant of a seizure order, it stated
that Vuitton failed to establish that an alternative remedy would not be
adequate.8 2 The district court, however, denied the request for the
seizure order without explaining how an alternative remedy would be
adequate.8 3 The Third Circuit concluded that to deny a request for a
seizure order under these circumstances was an abuse of discretion and
served to defeat the legislative purpose behind the Counterfeiting Act.8 4
For evidence of this legislative purpose the court again looked to
the legislative history and concluded that the Counterfeiting Act was
meant to provide a potent weapon against counterfeiters.8 5 This
weapon was to be available "whenever a temporary restraining order
and the threat of contempt for a violation thereof are unlikely to result
in preservation of the evidence and the removal of the counterfeit mer-
chandise from commerce."'8 6 By imposing an obligation to explain how
77. Id. at 574-76.
78. The seven factual findings are listed in the Counterfeiting Act. 15
U.S.C.A. § 11 16(d)(4)(B) (1988). For a discussion of the prerequisite factual
findings, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
79. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 570.
80. Id. at 575. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that it is necessary for
the district court to explain "how an ex parte restraining order can be expected
to effectively alter the defendant's behavior." Id.
81. The Third Circuit defined adequate relief as that relief which "effec-
tively alter[s] the defendant's behavior." Id.
82. Id. at 571.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 576.
85. Id. at 575. The court stated that the purpose of the Counterfeiting Act
was to create a "necessary tool to thwart the bad faith efforts of fly by night
defendants to evade the jurisdiction of the court." Id. (quotingJoint Statement
on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG. REC. H12076, H12081
(1984)).
86. Id. The court never directly linked the legislative purposes of 15
U.S.C.A. § 1116(d) (1988), as evidenced by the quoted statements, to the test
embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4)(B)(i) (requiring that court find that order
other than seizure order is adequate to achieve the purposes of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114). The court must have concluded that the language in 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 16(d)(1)(A), which states that seizure orders are available in actions arising
[Vol. 37: p. 11961208
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an alternative remedy would be adequate, the Third Circuit reinforced
the legislative purpose by forcing the district courts to thoroughly con-
sider the threat to the plaintiff's interests when considering a request for
an ex parte seizure order.
4. Finding Threat of Immediate and Irreparable Harm
In addition to adding a requirement that the district court explain
its rationale for rejecting a seizure application, the court also strength-
ened trademark protection by removing consideration of one of the
Counterfeiting Act factors from the lower court's discretion. Specifi-
cally, the court rejected the district court's conclusion that Vuitton
would not suffer irreparable injury in the absence of the seizure order. 87
Relying on Third Circuit cases that have held that "both potential dam-
age to reputation and likelihood of confusion constitute irreparable in-
jury,"8 8 the Third Circuit ruled, as a matter of law, that if a plaintiff
shows that a defendant is likely to flaunt an alternative remedy, then the
plaintiff has established the threat of immediate and irreparable harm. 89
under § 11 14(l)(a), established the necessary connection. The court does quote
extensively from the legislative history of § 1116(d):
The purpose of the ex parte seizure provision is to provide victims of
trademark counterfeiting with a means of ensuring that the courts are
able to exercise their jurisdiction effectively in counterfeiting cases.
Testimony before both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees es-
tablished that many of those who deal in counterfeits make it a practice
to destroy or transfer counterfeit merchandise when a day in court is on
the horizon. The ex parte seizure procedure is intended to thwart this
bad faith tactic, while ensuring ample procedural protections for per-
sons against whom such orders are issued. In essence, both the Senate
and House bills permitted issuance of an ex parte seizure order if the
applicant could show that the defendant would not comply with a lesser
court order, such as a temporary restraining order, and that there was
no means of protecting the court's authority other than to seize the
property in question on an ex parte basis.
Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 575.
87. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 576.
88. Id. (citing Opticians Ass'n v. Independent Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 195-
96 (3d Cir. 1990)). In Opticians, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the defendant from using the plaintiff's registered trademark. Opticians,
920 F.2d at 191. The plaintiff and defendant were originally part of a single
organization that had splintered. Id. The district court denied the plaintiff's
request for a preliminary injunction and the plaintiff then sought review' by the
Third Circuit. Id.
The Third Circuit held that "[g]rounds for finding irreparable injury in-
clude loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill." Id. at
195. The court in Opticians also held that "where the plaintiff makes a strong
showing of likely confusion, irreparable injury follows as a matter of course." Id. at
196 (emphasis added).
89. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 576. The court also addressed the district court's
hesitancy to utilize federal marshals to conduct seizures. Id. The court found
these concerns to be invalid in the face of "clear Congressional intent" to so
employ the marshals. Id.
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In addition to Third Circuit precedent, the Vuitton court again
looked to legislative history to determine Congress' definition of irrepa-
rable injury.90 The court concluded that "[h]aving found that [the] de-
fendants were likely to flaunt court orders to turn over the counterfeit
goods and so were likely to continue selling the counterfeit goods, the
district court had no choice but to conclude that Vuitton would suffer
irreparable injury in the absence of a seizure." 9' Accordingly, the Third
Circuit held that Vuitton had met the necessary prerequisites and that a
seizure order should have been granted. 9 2
IV. CONCLUSION
In Vuitton v. White, the Third Circuit decided a significant issue of
first impression and clarified the application of existing precedent to
procedures surrounding seizure orders granted or denied pursuant to
the Counterfeiting Act. 93 Recognition of a plaintiff's ability to seek im-
mediate review of the denial of a seizure order advances the federal
courts' ability to deal with the increasing problem of counterfeit goods
in commerce. Such a review will ensure that a plaintiff is provided the
utmost protection and will balance an equation that, prior to the enact-
ment of the Counterfeiting Act, had begun to tilt in favor of counterfeit-
ers and their ability to destroy or transfer merchandise. 94
The court has also clarified the application of two of the six prongs
of the test for granting seizure orders set forth in the Counterfeiting
Act. The court established that either potential damage to reputation or
the likelihood of confusion is sufficient to establish irreparable injury as
required under the Counterfeiting Act. 95 The court has also imposed
an affirmative duty upon the district courts to explain how an ex parte
restraining order would be as effective as a seizure order in cases where
a district court has found facts necessary to support the existence of the
other five factors.
Finally, the court established that any denial of a seizure order satis-
fies the two prong Carson test and is therefore reviewable. 9 6 By clarify-
ing this question of law, the court has enabled future litigants to be
certain of their ability to obtain judicial review. This will allow plaintiffs
90. Id. (quoting Joint Statement, 130 CONG. REc. at H12081 ("The courts




93. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 32-92 and ac-
companying text.
94. For a discussion of the congressional purpose behind 15 U.S.C.
§ 1I16(d) (seizure orders), see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
95. Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 576; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4)(B)(iv) (1988)
(setting forth requirement that plaintiff show that irreparable injury will occur if
seizure order not granted).
96. V/uitton, 945 F.2d at 574.
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to withdraw their alternative applications for preliminary injunctions
and protect the ex parte nature of the proceedings. This in turn will
better serve the two part objective of both Congress and plaintiffs: to
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